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MENTAL DISORDER IN ILLINOIS CRIMINAL
LAW
CLIFFORD J. HYNNING
T HERE has ever been a vast interest in the vagaries
of the minds of men, especially of those accused of
crime. At times this interest has been largely etiological:
Did the mental condition of the defendant bear any
causal relation to the commission of the offense with
which he stands charged.? At other times this interest
has manifested itself as seeking some excuse, some ex-
tenuating circumstances: Should a defendant who could
not know that it was wrong or who knew but could not
govern himself according to his knowledge be held crim-
inally responsible? Others have said that nothing much
can be known about the minds of men because of their
peculiarly subjective nature, and therefore any inquiry
into the "state of mind" is simply raising a dust cloud
behind which the defendant can conveniently escape
"justice."' Judges have occasionally spoken prejudici-
ally about insanity as a defense to crime.2 Newspapers
have emphasized, perhaps unduly, the frequency of such
defenses in sensational cases. But probably all these
views assume that the purposes of criminal prosecution
are punishment, and perhaps some justification exists
for such an assumption.'
Before proceeding any further, it may be instructive
to note the extent of the insanity defense in criminal pro-
cedure. During the years 1924-27 in Cook County, Illi-
nois, the finding of insanity verdicts was less than one-
1 See Alfred Sher, ''The Growth of the Plea of Insanity as a Defense
to Crime," 13 U. of Detroit Bi-Monthly L. Rev. 141 (1930), discussing
the "insanity dodge"; and Stebbins, "Legal Responsibility for Criminal
Acts," 7 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 704 (1928). Contrast Ballatine, "Criminal
Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble-Minded," 9 Jour. Crim. Law
486, (1919).
2 See a reversal on this ground in O'Shea v. People, 218 Ill. 352, 75 N.
E. 981 (1905).
3 See Mead's critical article on "The Psychology of Punitive Justice,"
23 Am. Jour. Soc. 577 (1918), and E. H. Sutherland, Criminology (New
York, Lippincott, 1924), pp. 339-53.
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half percent (0.47) in all criminal cases, and in murder
cases about four per cent.4  Consequently it is readily
seen that the emphasis that has been placed on the prob-
lem of mental disorder is unduly great. But this em-
phasis can be easily understood in view of the popular
conception of criminals as necessarily abnormal persons.'
It is not the objective of this paper to make any ex-
haustive inquiry into the development of the various
tests used to determine "criminal responsibility," which
has been competently treated by many writers, especially
by Professor Sheldon Glueck.6 For the scope of this
study it is necessary only to indicate that most of the so-
called tests used in present-day criminal courts are de-
rived from the famous answers of the judges of England
in McNaughten's Case,7 laying the foundation for the
knowledge and (old) delusion rules in the following
terms:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the
party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature or quality of the
act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong. . . .Where he labors under
a partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he
must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as
if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real.
It is to be observed that this case was decided in 1843
when the opinions of the judges may accurately have
4 Illinois Crime Survey, p. 757 (1929).
5 Contrast the view of modern criminologists. Professor Edwin H.
Sutherland concludes, "There is very little in this survey that shows a
distinct type of people who commit crime. So far as there is any evident
type it is the young-adult man living in the city; perhaps the negro
should be included in this type, but it is by no means certain that the
greater criminality is a racial rather than a cultural or economic trait.
There seems to be little difference between criminals and non-criminals
with reference to mentality or nationality." Criminology, p. 110.
6 Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1925), Chs. V-VIII. See also Henry Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in
Criminal Law (New York, Commonwealth Fund, 1933), pp. 17-68.
7 10 Cl. & Fin. 200.
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reflected the state of contemporary psychological knowl-
edge."
But even that was before the science of psychiatry was born.
It was a time when Francis Gall's fantastic theory of phren-
ology was at the height of its popularity. According to this
doctrine, each function of the mind was localized in its own
corner of the brain, and the phrenologist could measure a man's
"ambition," "amativeness," "docility," or what not, by meas-
uring the respective bumps on the skull. Thus, the theory con-
ceived of the brain as a bundle of functions, each working .in-
dependently. The opinion of the Judges reveals that they ac-
cepted a similar view, for they refer constantly to a person
suffering from delusion, "and not in other respects insane."
We know today that no such person exists. The mind is a
whole, and delusions are a symptom of the existence of some more
fundamental disturbance. There is no such thing as a man
suffering from "partial delusions only, and not in other respects
insane." Yet it is this discarded fanciful brain-child of an
eccentric Viennese physician of a 130 years ago that underlies
the cornerstone of our law governing the criminal responsibility
of the mentally unsound.9
While since then medicine and psychology have made
considerable advances, and the quaint faculty psychology
of this famous case has been relegated to the gypsy-tent,
yet many courts have refused to be led astray by adop-
ting what the Lord Chancellor of England termed "the
vicious principle of considering insanity as a disease.""°
Although it is true the right-and-wrong test of Mc-
Naghten's Case has been accepted as a minimum require-
ment in all American jurisdictions except New Hamp-
shire," there is very little authority that the slecial de-
lusion test therein announced has been accorded general
acceptance by American courts, in spite of the frequent
assumption that such is the case. It has been stated to
8 Glueek, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law, pp. 162 et seq.
9 Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, p. 4.
10 Quoted in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 574 (1886).
11 State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1869); State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369
(1871).
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be law in not more than nine states, has been ex-
pressly rejected in eight jurisdictions and by implication
in at least nine others.12
The doctrine thus promulgated as law has found its way into
the textbooks, and has doubtless been largely received as the
enunciation of a sound legal principle since that day. Yet it
is probable that no ingenuous student of the law ever read it
for the first time without being shocked by its exquisite inhu-
manity. It practically holds a man confessed to be insane, ac-
countable for the exercise of the same reason, judgment, and
controlling mental power, that is required of a man in perfect
mental health. It is, in effect, saying to the jury, the prisoner
was mad when he committed the act, but he did not use suffi-
cient reason in his madness.
1 3
12 Following the rule: Arkansas-Woodall v. State, 149 Ark. 33, 231 S. W.
186 (1921) ; Florida-Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926) ; Indiana
-McHargue v. State, 193 Ind. 204, 139 N. E. 316 (1923); Iowa-State v.
Mewherter, 46 Iowa 88 (1877) which may be overruled by State v. Buck, 205
Iowa 1028, 219 N. W. 17 (1928); Massachusetts-Commonwealth v. Rogers,
7 Metc. 500 (1844) ; Nevada-State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241
(1889); Tennessee-Davis v. State, 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S. W. (2d) 993 (1930);
Texas-Alexander v. State, 8 S. W. (2d) 176 (1928), ignoring Merritt v.
State, 39 Tex. Crim. App. 70, 45 S. W. 21 (1898); Utah-State v. Green,
78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. (2d) 177 (1931).
Expressly rejecting the rule: Alabama-Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2
So. 854 (1886); Colorado-Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756
(1915); District of Columbia-Guteau's Case, 10 F. 161 (1882); Mississippi
-Kearney v. State, 68 Miss. 233, 8 So. 292 (1890); Montana-State v.
Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362, 101 Am. St. Rep. 579 (1904); Nebraska-
Kraus v. State, 108 Neb. 331, 187 N. W. 895 (1922); New Hampshire-
State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369 (1871); Texas-Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Crim.
App. 70, 45 S. W. 21 (1898), ignored in Alexander v. State, 8 S. W. (2d)
176 (1928) where the delusion test was held proper.
Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, p. 75, concludes that
the following jurisdictions have impliedly rejected the test in the cases
cited: California-People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 Pac. 124 (1907);
Illinois-People v. Geary, 297 Ill. 608, 131 N. E. 97 (1921); Kansas-State v.
Arnold, 79 Kan. 533, 100 Pac. 64 (1909); Kentucky-Banks v. Common-
wealth, 145 Ky. 800, 141 S. W. 380 (1911); Minnesota-State v. Scott, 41
Minn. 365, 43 N. W. 62 (1889); Missouri-State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo.
193, 101 S. W. 27 (1907); New York-People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324,
110 N. E. 945 (1915); Pennsylvania-Commonwealth v. Calhoun, 238 Pa.
474, 86 Atl. 472 (1913); Vermont-Doherty v. People, 73 Vt. 380, 50 AtI.
1113 (1901).
As to the last group of cases, alleged impliedly to have rejected the de-
lusion rule, it must be observed that there is wide opportunity for differences
of opinion. The writer would hesitate to make such a generalization from
the opinion in People v. Geary, supra.
13 Judge Ladd in State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369 (1871).
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It is certainly not clear just in what relation the judges
of England considered the special delusion rule to stand
to the general right-and-wrong rule, probably only in
supplement to it under some circumstances. Confusion
has only been added to confusion in many American de-
cisions where the delusion test is phraseologically tied
up with "irresistible impulse,"1 4 and in one jurisdiction
with a metaphysical "overmastery of the will."15
The explanation for the special references found in the opinions
of many courts to delusion as a test or symptom, is, again, his-
torical. In 1800, Lord Erskine, in his eloquent defense of Had.
field had stated that "delusion . . . where there is no frenzy
or raving madness, is the true character of insanity."1 6 Hadfield
was acquitted, but more because of Erskine's brilliant discourse
than because the court agreed with his view of the law. Cer-
tainly the idea that delusion was to be taken as the test of in-
sanity in all cases "where there is no frenzy or raving madness"
was accepted in no subsequent English case. However, the fact
that Erskine won his case, and that the judge said of his remarks
that "there can be no doubt upon earth" but that they were
the law, has caused many American judges to assume the case
is law, and that Erskine's delusion test must be fitted somewhere
into the legal test of insanity. Hence the long instructions on
delusion by trial judges, and a discussion of the same topic by
appellate courts, often without much reference to the general
tests of responsibility adopted in the jurisdiction.17
To the established right-and-wrong rule has been added
another test by some eighteen jurisdictions to the effect
that if the defendant, although knowing the act to be
wrong, is incapable of controlling an impulse to commit it,
or, as others have phrased it, is incapable of making a
14 Arkansas, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Utah in cases cited in footnote 12.
15 State v. Glover, 129 Ga. 717, 59 S. E. 816 (1907).
1627 How. St. Tr. 1282.
17 Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, pp. 71-73. See also
Hotema v. U. S., 186 U. S. 413 (1901), affirming conviction for killing a
woman under the belief that she was a witch; and Guiteau's Case, 10 F. 161
(1882), where Judge Cox dogmatically instructed the jury that an "insane
delusion is never the result of reasoning and reflection."
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choice, he shall be acquitted. This is the so-called "irre-
sistible impulse" test.' To this test, which certainly is
not clear, courts have constantly added qualifications and
restrictions, making its application to concrete facts ex-
ceedingly difficult.
Having thus stated in very general terms the common-
law tests of legal insanity, it is the purpose of the writer
to examine in some detail the Illinois statutes and cases
on mental disorder as excusing crime, postponing crim-
inal prosecution or execution, and the procedural prob-
lems of proving mental disorder, before subjecting the
law as thus ascertained to general psychological and
sociological criticisms.
18 Definitely following this test: Alabama-Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577,
2 So. 854 (1886) ; Arkansas-Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 S. W. 186 (1915);
Colorado-Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756 (1915); Connecticut-
State v. Saxon, 87 Conn. 5, 86 At. 590 (1913); Delaware-State v. Reidell,
9 Houst. 470, 14 Ad. 550 (1888); District of Columbia-Smith v. U. S., 36 F.
(2d) 548 (1929); Illinois-People v. Lowhone, 292 Ill. 32, 126 N. E. 620
(1920); Indiana-Morgan v. State, 190 Ind. 411, 130 N. E. 528 (1920);
Kentucky-Scott v. Commonwealth, 61 Ky. 227 (1863); Michigan-People v.
Bowen, 165 Mich. 231, 130 N. W. 706 (1911); Ohio-Blackburn v. State, 23
Ohio St. 146 (1872); Virginia-Thurman v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 912, 60
S. E. 99 (1908); Vermont-State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 108 Atl. 391 (1919);
Wyoming-Flanders v. State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 Pac. 1121 (1916).
Probably following this test: Louisiana-State v. Tapie, 173 La. 780, 138
So. 665 (1931) ; Massachusetts-Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500 (1844) ;
Montana-State v. Colbert, 58 Mont. 584, 194 Pac. 145 (1920) ; New Mexico-
Terr. v. Kennedy, 15 N. Mex. 556, 110 Pac. 854 (1910).
One of the leading cases is Parsons v. State, supra, where Judge Somer-
ville suggested the following tests:
"1. Was the defendant at the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
as a matter of fact, afflicted with a disease of the mind, so as to be
either idiotic, or otherwise insane?
"2. If such be the case, did he know right from wrong as applied to the
particular act in question? If he did not have such knowledge, he is
not legally responsible.
"3. If he did have such knowledge, he may nevertheless not be legally
responsible if the two following conditions concur:
(1) If, by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far
lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid
doing the act in question, as that his free agency was at the time
destroyed.
(2) And if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so connected with
such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have
been the product of it solely."
It should be noted that most jurisdictions do not impose the latter condi.
tion of sole causation.
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THE LEGAL PROBLEM
In criminal law, mental disorder may be significant
either as excuse for the crime or as ground for postpon-
ing prosecution or execution. Where mental disorder is
pleaded as an excuse to crime, it must be proved to have
existed at the time of committing the offense; in other
words, it attacks the element of criminal intent, which
must coincide with the overt act in order that the defend-
ant can be said to be held criminally responsible. If it
is shown to have occurred at any subsequent time, it
cannot, under conventional legal theory, operate as ex-
cusing the crime (and its consequences, i. e., punishment),
but merely as postponing either the prosecution of the
charge or the execution of a capital sentence. Likewise
significant are the procedural problems of how and
when the mental disorder of the defendant can be brought
to the attention of the court, or proving mental disorder
in a jury court governed by common-law rules of evi-
dence, largely concerning expert testimony and hypo-
thetical questions, and of the burden of proof. Conse-
quently, the ensuing sections are divided into (1) Mental
Disorder at the Time of the Offense, (2) At the Time
of the Trial, (3) After Trial, (4) Putting Mental Dis-
order in Issue, (5) Method of Proof, and (6) Burden of
Proof. .
i. MENTAL DISORDER AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE
It is elementary in law that a crime consists of the
coincidence of an overt act contrary to public law and a
criminal intent.19 But before a person accused of.crime
can be said to be capable of entertaining a criminal intent,
he must possess, in the words of the statute, "sound mind
and discretion." 20 The Illinois Criminal Code, in section
592, purports to define, in a very confusing manner, the
nature of insanity that will negative criminal responsi-
bility:
A lunatic or insane person, without lucid intervals, shall not be
19 Ilinois Criminal Code, sec. 588.
20 Ibid., see. 589. See also Moore, Illinois Criminal Law and Procedure,
(3d ed., 1932), see. 9.
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found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor with which he may
be charged: Provided, the act so charged as criminal shall have
been committed in the condition of insanity.
21
The first decided case of the Illinois Supreme Court
bearing on the problem of mental disorder as related to
the criminal law was that of Fisher v. People2 (1859), in
which the jury raised some of the perplexing problems of
this particular branch of the criminal law in a communi-
cation sent to the trial judge after retiring to the jury-
room for deliberation. Their questions were:
1. Is it lawful for a juryman to go behind our statute law
and search the Bible to see whether our statute laws are not
void in consequence of their disagreement with the higher
law?
2. Is it lawful for a juror to go behind the testimony and read
medical books to see whether the doctors and others ex-
amined at the trial testified correctly or not?
3. Is it lawful for a juryman to go behind the trial and search
law books to see whether the judge did not exclude some
testimony that ought to have been admitted?
4. Is it lawful for a juror to go behind the instructions of the
court and search law books for tie purpose of finding some
error in said instructions?
5. Is it lawful for a juror, after admitting the proof of every
essential fact which constitutes a certain crime, to bring
in a different verdict, because he, the said juror, does not ap-
prove of the penalty attached to the first?
If so, how long must we remain in this worse than purgatory
and be abused and villified by a fanatical madman?
21 "This statute lays down an amazing proposition-that only those
lunatics and insane persons who have no 'lucid intervals' shall be ex-
empt from punishment. The proviso of the statute is redundant and
superfluous, for if the insane person had no lucid intervals any act done
by him must necessarily have been done in a 'condition of insanity.'
The statute prescribes no symptoms, but simply requires a state of
lunacy or insanity without 'lucid intervals.' " Keedy, "Insanity and
Criminal Responsibility," 30 Harvard L. Rev. 535, 724, at p. 732.
22 23 I11. 218.
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The court, deciding that it was error for the trial judge
to answer these queries by the statement that the jury
was bound by the law as given it by the court inasmuch
as at that time the jury in Illinois was judge of the law
as well as the facts of the case,23 suggested that "before
such a plea (of insanity) be allowed to prevail, satisfac-
tory evidence should be offered that the accused.., was
affected with insanity and, at the time he committed the
act, was incapable of appreciating its enormity." This is
simply the right-and-wrong rule interwoven with a
difficult question of procedure (burden of proof), about
which more shall be said in an ensuing section. The case
cited no authorities within this jurisdiction on the ques-
tion of mental disorder, referred only to a few of the
English and early American cases, and is on the whole a
very unsatisfactory treatment of the problem, which was,
it must be conceded, not so directly before the court.
Only four years passed before the Supreme Court was
given the opportunity again, in 1863, to discuss the
problem of mental disorder, in the leading case of Hopps
v. People.24 It is in this case that the Illinois Supreme
Court first suggested a test which later became known as
that of "irresistible impulse."
Whenever it shall appear from the evidence, that at the time
of doing the act charged, the prisoner was not of sound mind,
but affected with insanity, and such affection was the efficient
cause of the act, and that he would not have done the act but
for that affection, he ought to be acquitted. . . . But this un-
soundness of mind, or affection of insanity, must be of such a
degree as to create an uncontrollable impulse to do the act
charged, by overriding the reason and judgment, and obliterat-
ing the sense of right and wrong as to the particular act done,
and depriving the accused of the power of choosing between
them.
It must be noted that, although the court used the
phrase "uncontrollable impulse," this decision does not
28 Contra, People v. Bruner, 343 IlL 146, 175 N. E. 400 (1931).
24 31 Ill. 385.
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state unqualifiedly the test of irresistible impulse, for it
attached certain essential consequences to the impulse,
as "obliterating the sense of right and wrong," which,
practically, is little more than the conventional doctrine
of right and wrong. The court, however, did include in
its statement one of the theoretical cornerstones of the
impulse test: the power of choice. And so it is not so
difficult to understand why later judges of the Illinois
Supreme Court were able to declare that the test of
irresistible impulse was part of the law of Illinois, and
cite this case as their authority.
While decided in 1863 and a leading case on mental
disorder in Illinois, the language of the Hopps case indi-
cates a liberal spirit, which is only infrequently noted in
most cases, that the law should keep apace with the de-
velopments of modern science. It is quite true that the
court's description of mental disorder is a quaint variety
of the old faculty psychology, as indicated in the extended
following quotation from that case, but that was unques-
tionably the predominant scientific view of the time.
It is now generally conceded, that insanity is a disease of the
brain, of that mass of matter through and by which that mys-
terious power, the mind, acts. There, the mind is supposed to
be enthroned, acting through separate and distinct organs.
These organs may become diseased, one or more or all, and in the
degree, or to the extent of such disease, is insanity measured. A
disease of all the organs causes total insanity, while one or more,
partial insanity only.... It is but very lately that insanity has
become a subject of careful scientific investigation, which has
made, and is making, rapid progress. This investigation en-
ables experts to detect simulated insanity with much more cer-
tainty than could -formerly be done. Shall we ignore and de-
nounce the results of human study and research on this subject,
while we recognize and applaud the advancement of science in
all other directions? Peoples and governments in all civilized
countries recognize them by the erection of vast asylums for
these unfortunates, where this science can be carefully studied
by those who will devote their lives to the investigation of this
28 292 Ill. 32, 120 N. E. 620.
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subject, where very many, by careful scientific treatment, are
restored and become useful members of society. To say that men
by careful study and investigation can acquire no skill on this
subject, while the same study and investigation will constantly
develop new truths on all other subjects, would be a daring
assumption upon which we cannot consent to hang a fellow man.
This case was followed in Dunn v. People," where the
court attempted to clarify the test laid down in the pre-
ceding case by eliding the confusing phrase of the "im-
pulse obliterating the sense of right and wrong" and
bringing more to the fore the power of choice.
Where reason and judgment are not overcome, but the person
charged with crime at the time retains the power to choose be-
tween right and wrong as to the particular act done, he cannot
escape responsibility for his acts under a plea of insanity....
So, if at the time a deadly assault is made, the person making the
assault knew that it was wrong to commit such an act, and had
the power of mind to choose either to do or not to do, and of
controlling his conduct in accordance with such choice, he will
be amenable to the law, although he was not entirely and per-
fectly sane.
But in 1892 the Supreme Court restated the confusing
phraseology of the Hopps case in its decision of Hornish
v. People,26 reinserting the phrase of "obliterating the
sense of right and wrong" as an essential effect of the
"uncontrollable impulse."
This unsoundness of mind or affection of insanity must be of
such a degree as to create an uncontrollable impulse to do the
act charged, by overriding the reason and judgment, and ob-
literating the sense of right and wrong as to the particular
act done, and depriving the accused of the power of choosing be-
tween them.
27
It was not until 1920, however, that the Illinois Su-
preme Court, in the leading case of People v. Lowhone,8
25 109 Ill. 635 (1884).
26 142 I. 620, 32 N. E. 677.
27 Expressly followed in Lilly v. People, 148 Ill. 467, 36 N. E. 95 (1894),
and Meyer v. People, 156 Il. 126, 40 N. E. 490 (1895).
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authoritatively adopted the test of "irresistible impulse,"
without the confusing limitations appended by the Hopps
and Hornish cases. Although the court specifically un-
dertook to point out that great advances had been made
in the field of psychiatry since the decision of the Hopps
case in 1863, it clung tenaciously to the notion of "partial
insanity," (thus implicitly recognizing and relying on
the quaint but now thoroughly discredited faculty psy-
chology), which the court naively imagined to be illus-
trated by paranoia, the test of which was said to be that
* . . the afflicted person, to be responsible for a crime, must not
only be capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, but
he must also be mentally capable of choosing either to do or not
to do the act constituting the crime, and of governing his con-
duct in accordance with such choice.... An insane impulse which
may impel a man to commit an unlawful act without being guilty
of a criminal intent must be the result not merely of an in-
flamed passion but of an insane delusion which is due to a
diseased mind, and which, without any provocation, so over-
powers his reason as to render him incapable of refraining from
committing the act.2 9
The difficulty of proof of such a supposed state of mental
disorder (which the court seems to consider susceptible
of being distinctly recognized) is reflected in the fact that
the defendant Lowhone's conviction and sentence to
death upon the second trial was affirmed with little dis-
cussion of the tests of insanity 0 But the case does indi-
cate that the Supreme Court realized the gap between
that hypothetical state of mental disorder termed "legal
insanity" and the modern socio-psychological concep-
tions of mental maladjustments, and that the court was
attempting to bridge the gap, although predicating its
solution upon a heavy emphasis on a very dubious free-
29 Other cases following this test: People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508, 145
N. E. 207 (1924); People v. Krauser, 315 Ill. 485, 146 N. E. 593 (1925);
People v. Preston, 341 111. 407, 173 N. E. 383 (1930); and People v.
Witte, 350 Ill. 558, 183 N. E. 622 (1932). Not all of these cases noted
the limitation in the applicability of the test, stated in the Lowhone
case, to cases of paranoia and similar types of disease.
30 296 Ill. 391, 129 N. E. 781 (1921).
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dom of choice, which is so apt to resolve itself into an
endless dispute over a metaphysical freedom of the will.
The older cases seemed to require that acquittal on
ground of insanity can only be returned where the mental
disorder is shown to be fixed. A mere temporary intoxi-
cated frenzy or mental affliction was held insufficient in
Upstone v. People,1 which was admittedly not the ordi-
nary case of drunkenness, for the court treated it as ac-
tual insanity, but insufficient because of its temporary
character. Compare with this case the recent decision
in People v. Cochran,32 where the court, referring to the
preceding case as a "reactionary decision," said that
Long continued habits of intemperance which produce permanent
mental diseases amounting to insanity, which so weaken and im-
pair the mind that one committing an offense has not mind
enough at the time to know right from wrong and has not suffi-
cient mind and will power to refrain from doing the act, relieve
a person from responsibility under the law, the same as insanity
from any other cause.
The effect that drugs (cocaine) might have on the mind
as relevant to the issue of criminal responsibility was
presented in the case of People v. Penman,3" where the
court recognized it as constituting a defense by holding it
to be error to refuse the following instruction:
If the jury believe from the evidence that the shooting alleged
to have been done by the defendant was done at a time when
the defendant was affected by and labored under an attack of a
brief or temporary madness or insanity, the result of an involun-
tary taking by the defendant of some drug preceding the act,
and that he was thereby rendered unconscious of what he was
doing, that would constitute in law a complete and entire de-
fense.
31 109 Il. 169 (1883).
32 313 Il1. 508, 145 N. E. 207 (1924).
33 271 Il1. 82, 110 N. E. 894 (1915).
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Mere emotional instability, lack of self-control, general
nervous maladjustment,"4 subnormal mentality, 5 and the
fact that the defendant was "not entirely and perfectly
sane' '86 have been held insufficient to excuse crime where
the effect was not such as to indicate lack of knowledge of
the right and wrong or deprive one of the power of
choice.
In concluding this examination of cases where the
mental disorder of the defendant has been offered as a
complete defense or excuse to crime, it may be well to
summarize in a very general statement what legal in-
sanity at the time of the offense would probably be held
to include. A person will be acquitted on ground of in-
sanity in Illinois, according to present legal theory, if,
at the time of the commission of the offense, he did not
have such a mental condition that he could appreciate
whether the particular act in question was wrong, or, if
he knew it to be wrong, that he could mentally choose to
refrain from committing it.87
I. AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL
At common law it was well established that a person
accused of crime could not be prosecuted therefor if he
were incapacitated by reason of his mental condition to
prepare an adequate defense. The Illinois Criminal
Code, in section 593, adopts this rule of the common law38
in the following terms:
34 People v. Ortiz, 320 Ill. 205, 150 N. E. 708 (1926), where the court
said, "The fact that one's jealousy is easily aroused does not necessarily
show a deluded mind. It does not follow that a man is insane because
he lacks self-control. Nor does the making of a confession by a person
charged with crime denote insanity. There are sane persons who oc-
casionally exhibit a loss of self-control and even an inclination to con-
fess criminal acts;" and People v. Pokasa, 342 Ill. 404, 174 N. E. 544
(1931).
35People v. Marquis, 344 Ill. 261, 176 N. E. 314 (1931), where the
court said, "A mere subnormal mentality is not a defense to a charge of
crime unless the accused is by reason thereof unable to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong with respect to the particular act in question."
386 People v. Witte, 350 Ill. 558, 183 N. E. 622 (1932).
87 See Dr. H. Douglas Singer, "IDeranged and Defective Delinquents,"
in Illinois Crime Survey, p. 750.
88 See People v. Gavrilovich, 265 Ill. 11, 106 N. E. 521 (1914), where
the court expressly held this provision merely declaratory of the common
law.
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A person that becomes lunatic or insane after the commission
of a crime or misdemeanor shall not be tried for the offense
during the continuance of the lunacy or insanity.
It is to be observed that the vague phrases used by
the statute-lunacy or insanity-cannot logically be used
in the same sense as insanity or lunacy at the time of the
offense, to which the preceding section of this paper was
devoted. The law here adopts as its standard of sanity
a mental condition in which the defendant can appreciate
the difficulty in which he has become involved, take intelli-
gent means to prepare an adequate defense, as securing
the aid of competent counsel and informing him of the
relevant facts. If he can do this the law considers him
sane as far as the trial of the criminal case is concerned. 9
It is obvious that the mental condition of the defendant
should be determined before the trial. Either the court
will act on its own motion, as is frequently done in the
Cook County Criminal Court by referring the defendant




The mental condition of the defendant may be a rele-
vant question after trial in two situations. He may have
become mentally disordered after'verdict but before
sentence (probably a very rare occurrence); or he may
have become mentally disordered after sentence but be-
fore execution in a capital case. In both situations the
statute provides that the criminal proceeding (i. e., sen-
89 See dictum in People v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N. E. 652 (1921).
In People v. Vareeha, 353 Ill. 52, 186 N. E. 607 (1933), a sentence to
death upon a plea of guilty was reversed, because the defendant was
alleged to be mentally defective, and hence could not make such a plea,
although at the time of making it he seemed to appreciate its conse-
quences.
40People v. Maynard, 347 Ill. 422, 179 N. E. 833 (1932).
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tence or execution) shall be postponed until the defendant
has regained his sanity. 1
The statutory provisions, quoted in the footnote, were
rather fully construed in the leading case of People v.
Geary,"2 where the court held that the issue of insanity
occurring after sentence must be tried by a jury as in an
ordinary civil case, whose sole function should be to de-
termine whether the defendant was insane or lunatic at
the time of the impaneling of the jury.
When one about to be executed is to be considered as insane or
lunatic is not so well established by the authorities, but we think
it is clear that within the meaning of our statute the defendant
is to be regarded as sane, and not insane or lunatic, when he
has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the pro-
ceedings against him, what he was tried for originally, the pur-
pose of his punishment, the impending fate which awaits him,
and a sufficient mind to know any facts which might exist which
would make his punishment unjust or unlawful and sufficient
intelligence to convey such information to his attorney or to
the court. When he has not such intelligence and mental ability,
he is to be regarded as insane or lunatic by the verdict of the
jury, if so found, and his execution stayed or prolonged.
The proper manner for a defendant to raise the issue
of his subsequent mental disorder is by a petition alleging
such mental disorder supported by affidavits. If the de-
fendant is found by the jury to .be insane, the court will
order a stay in the execution till recovery and confine-
ment meanwhile in a hospital under proper safe-keeping.
The opinion in this case argued that inasmuch as the
statute provided only for one trial to determine whether
41 "If, after the verdict of guilty, and before judgment pronounced,
such person become lunatic or insane, then no judgment shall be given
while such lunacy or insanity shall continue. And if, after judgment
and before execution of the sentence, such person become lunatic or
insane, then in case the punishment be capital, the execution thereof
shall be stayed until the recovery of the said person from the insanity or
lunacy. In all of these cases it shall be the duty of the court to im-
panel a jury to try the question whether the accused be, at the time of
impaneling, insane or lunatic." See. 593. See also Moore, Illinois Crim-
inal Law and Procedure, see. 1466.
42 298 Ill. 236, 131 N. E. 652 (1921).
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a defendant has become insane after his conviction and
sentence, no review can be had from the finding of the
insanity inquest, either by motion to set aside the verdict,
appeal, or writ of error."3 But in the subsequent case of
People v. Preston,+4 the court, undertaking to explain
this latter holding as dictum, definitely decided that the
verdict of such an insanity inquest is always subject to
the court's inherent power to set it aside and order an-
other trial on the motion of either party and the showing
of proper grounds.
After a defendant has been found to be insane by
such a statutory inquest, there is a presumption that the
mental disorder of the defendant continued. It is not,
however, conclusive as to insanity at any other time.
Upon a petition signed by the State's Attorney, sup-
ported by affidavits, the court can properly inquire
whether the defendant has regained his sanity by a jury
in a similar civil proceeding, in which the defendant will
be duly represented by a guardian ad litem appointed by
the court.
45
IV. PUTTING MENTAL DISORDER IN ISSUE
In a few states the defense of mental disorder must be
specially pleaded, or it otherwise cannot be put in issue.
4
6
But at common law and in most American states, includ-
ing Illinois, the plea of not guilty puts directly in issue
the defendant's mental condition as an essential ingredi-
ent of the crime. It is of course true that the prosecution
have a right to rely, and do in fact rely, on the presump-
tion of sanity, as will be indicated in an ensuing section,
and usually no evidence of the mental condition is intro-
43 The court had somewhat similarly held in People v. Bechtel, 297 Ill.
312, 130 N. E. 728 (1921), where there had been a sanity inquest prelim-
inary to trial.
44 345 Ill. 11, 177 N. E. 761 (1931).
45 People v. Scott, 326 Ill. 327, 157 N. E. 215 (1927). The defendant
committed suicide before the new trial could be held.
46 Glueck, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, p. 22. See further Shep-
herd, "The Plea of Insanity under the 1927 Amendment to the California
Penal Code," 3 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1928); and "Failure to Plead Insanity
as a Defense," 6 U. of Cincinnati L. Rev. 313 (1932).
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
duced until the defendant puts it in. Usually this matter
of putting the mental disorder of the defendant in issue
presents no legal problem.
But in 1928 a very perplexing and interesting problem
was presented to the Illinois Supreme Court in the case
of People v. Hart,4 7 where the defendant had been con-
victed of robbery. When the jury returned a verdict of
guilty, but reported a further finding that the defendant
was then insane, the trial judge committed the defendant
to the Chester State Hospital for the Criminal Insane.
An appeal from this order was taken to the Supreme
Court on the very ingenious ground that, the statute hav-
ing expressly provided that an accused who is insane at
the time of the trial cannot be tried while in that mental
condition, and the defendant having been insane at the
time of the trial, he had been erroneously prosecuted.
The purpose of the statute was obviously to protect per-
sons accused of crime from prosecution when their mental
condition was such that they could not make an intelligent
defense. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the
trial court committing the defendant to Chester, and
remanded the case "with directions to the trial judge to
enter a proper judgment and sentence on the finding of
the jury that the defendant was guilty in manner and
form as charged in the indictment," on the ground that
the finding of the jury should be treated as superfluous in-
asmuch as the defendant had not properly put in issue his
mental condition as of the time of the trial.
It is submitted that the decision of the judges of the
Illinois Supreme Court that the defendant, found insane
by the jury, must be considered as having waived the is-
sue of insanity as of the trial by failing to put it in issue
in a technical manner, is far from satisfactory. Such an
argument is logically inconsistent with the underlying
purpose of the common-law rule, enacted into statutory
form in Illinois, that an insane person accused of crime
47 333 fI1. 169, 164 N. E. 156, critically noted in 42 Harvard L. Rev.
830, and 20 Jour. Crim. Law 142.
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cannot be tried while in such a condition of mental dis-
order because he cannot then make an intelligent and
proper defense. To hold that an insane person waived
the issue by failing to put in a technicalplea, and hence
that the finding of the jury must be regarded as super-
fluous, is absurd."8
V. METHOD OF PROOF
The courts treat mental disorder as involving a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to determine, and consequently
are very reluctant to disturb the verdict of a jury unless
clearly against the weight of the evidence. It is hardly
necessary to point out the utter futility of trying very
complex problems of mental disease before a lay jury.
Consider further the situation formerly in Illinois when
the jury was considered judge of the law as well as of the
facts of the case. 9 Under such a theory of the jury
function, several Supreme Court decisions approved of
the practice of reading to the jury in argument lengthy
extracts from opinions of decided cases.50 In view of the
great confusion of language used by the Supreme Court
from time to time this practice was not at all peculiarly
conducive to an intelligent performance of the jury func-
tion. But in view of a recent case"' holding that the jury
is no longer judge of the law but only of the facts of the
case, it is open to very serious doubt that such a confus-
ing practice can be sustained.
Evidence of mental disorder may take several forms-
as facts of the abnormal conduct of the defendant, ex-
pressed beliefs and ideas, and opinion evidence. Opinion
evidence consists either of those of neighbors and ac-
48 In People v. Varecha, 353 Ill. 52, 186 N. E. 607 (1933), the Supreme
Court reversed a death sentence upon a plea of guilty where the defend-
ant was allegedly mentally defective, although the mental disorder as of
the time of the trial was not raised until after sentence. This is in
effect an overruling of the Hart case, which was not mentioned by the
Court in the Varecha case.
49 Fisher v. People, 23 Ill. 218 (1859).
50 See Preston v. People, 341 Ill. 407, 173 N. E. 383 (1930). But con-
trast People v. Krauser, 315 Il. 485, 146 N. E. 593 (1925).
51 People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N. E. 400 (1931).
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quaintances of the defendant that he is sane or insane,
stating the facts upon which such an opinion is based, or
of the opinions of expert psychiatrists, usually formu-
lated on the basis of hypothetical questions, or, occasion-
ally, on the basis of an actual examination of the defend-
ant.
52
The courts have usually held that the mere commission
of an unnatural or atrocious crime is not evidence of
mental disorder, nor abandoned habits.5 3 It is, however,
logically relevant and should be considered along with
the other evidence, as it frequently is. Courts are some-
what reluctant 54 to consider the expressed beliefs and
theories of the defendant as evidence of his mental
disorder, probably because of their insistence on treating
such delusions as a mental disease in and of themselves
rather than symptoms of mental disorder, and hence not
significant to the court, nor from the layman's point of
view, unless clearly related to the criminal act com-
mitted.55
There has been a decided tendency, however, to liber-
alize the rules of evidence and procedure in admitting
relevant evidence bearing on the mental state of the de-
fendant, as is illustrated in the case of People v.
Krauser,6 decided in 1925. In this case physicians were
permitted to testify in regard to facts disclosed at a
physical and mental examination of the defendant prior
to the trial or during an adjournment, and the court held
that testimony as to the defendant's statements during
such an examination did not violate his constitutional
privilege to be a witness against himself, provided the
testimony was limited to the sole question of the defend-
52 See Glueck, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, pp. 26-40.
53 People v. Spencer, 264 Ill. 124, 106 N. E. 219 (1914); and People v.
Lowhone, 296 Iln. 391, 129 N. E. 781 (1921).
54 See People v. Geary, 297 Ill. 608, 131 N. E. 97 (1921).
55 See Glueck, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, pp. 119 et seq.; and
note Index, under Mind.
56 315 Ill. 485, 146 N. E. 593 (1925).
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ant's mental condition. The court also permitted the
experts to state in their testimony the results of intelli-
gence tests.
Compare with this case that of People v. Scott,57 de-
cided in 1927, where the Supreme Court held that it was
error to admit the reports made by the Department of
Public Welfare physicians (including those of Doctors
Adler and Schroeder, State Criminologists) because in-
competent as hearsay. In holding that the trial court
also erred in appointing expert witnesses to examine the
defendant with a view toward qualifying as court wit-
nesses in the case, the Illinois Supreme Court largely
relied on a very doubtful decision of the ultra-conserva-
tive Michigan Supreme Court"' invalidating a statute
authorizing trial courts to appoint qualified experts to
examine the defendant and testify in court as to the
conclusions drawn from such an examination. It is gen-
erally agreed that the court has the inherent power to
bring any evidence that is otherwise competent before
the jury for consideration on its own motion." It has been
observed that this case was a statutory proceeding to
determine the sanity of the defendant after conviction
and pending execution, and the statute did not authorize
the court to consider evidence on its own motion. The
writer, however, fails to see the relevancy of this varia-
tion from cases where the courts admittedly have the in-
herent power to bring evidence before the tribunal on its
57 326 fll. 327, 157 N. E. 215.
58 People v. Dickerson, 164 Mich. 148, 129 N. W. 199 (1910), critically
noted in 24 Harvard L. Rev. 483, 51 Reports of Am. Bar Assn. 441 (1926).
Dean Wigmore characteristically writes, "It is a pity that the court
suffered such a severe attack of dikastophobia on the sight of this harm-
less statute. As the history and authorities of the present subject are
ignored in the opinion and as its fantastic logic would hardly be fol-
lowed elsewhere, no further notice of its contents is needed." 5 Evi-
dence 436. Yet this is the "authority,, upon which the Illinois Supreme
Court relied in the Scott case! By statute trial courts are expressly
authorized to appoint such experts in New York, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Colorado, Wisconsin, and Louisiana; and such appointment is mandatory
in California and Indiana. See Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in
Criminal Law, p. 210.
59 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, (2d ed.) sec. 2484.
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own motion. The statutory authorization for the pro-
ceeding is exceedingly scant.6 0 Since this proceeding has
been admittedly governed by the ordinary rules of evi-
dence, there seems to be little reason for depriving the
judge of the exercise of one function which he would
ordinarily possess, and which is presumably in the
interests of all parties concerned.61
Answer to a hypothetical question is the generally ap-
proved manner in which the expert presents his testi-
mony.2 There is, however, no valid reason for the exis-
tence of the hypothetical question other than the very
vague one that the opinion evidence of the expert would
otherwise be invading the peculiar province of the jury,
but it does that anyway. Every one in the courtroom
knows that the "hypothetical monstrosity, whose mental
condition the expert is asked to pass on, is the defendant;
and it is impossible, psychologically, for the jury or the
expert, answering the hypothetical question about the
assumed person, not to be influenced by this knowl-
edge." 63  It may further be objected that the various
component elements of the question appear to receive
equal weight, while "there are statements of fact in the
hypothetical question which the expert knows, because he
has heard the testimony and seen the person who gave
it, to be absolutely worthless, and yet such a statement
is given the same value in the question as any other."
The question and the answer very frequently mislead the
60 See sec. 593, quoted in n. 41.
61 Independently of statute this practice has been sustained in People
v. Linton, 102 Cal. App. 608, 283 Pac. 389 (1929), subsequently enacted
into statutory form; State v. Paine, 49 La. Ann. 1092, 22 So. 316 (1897),
State v. Genna, 163 La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927), similarly enacted into
statutory form after the decision; State v. Cockriel, 314 Mo. 699, 285
S. W. 440 (1926); State v. Petty, 32 Nev. 384, 108 Pac. 934 (1910); and
State v. Home, 171 N. C. 787, 88 S. E. 433 (1916).
Note that expert witnesses were historically regarded almost as amici
curiae and were called by the court. Chamberlayne, Modern Law "of
Evidence, Vol. III, see. 2376 (1912).
62 People v. Geary, 297 Ill. 608, 131 N. E. 97 (1921).
63 White, Insanity and the Criminal Law, pp. 81.
64 Ibid., p. 86.
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jury into believing that the facts assumed in the question
have in fact been proved.
Dr. John E. Lind, an alienist of many years' experience
in the courts, has written a very engaging article on "The
Cross-Examination of the Alienist," 65 which will bear
somewhat extended quotation.
It is thought these [impressions] might serve to show how
easily the psychiatrist testifying in a murder trial may be put
in a false position, how difficult it is for him to present his con-
ception of the case to the jury, how skillfully his statements
may be emasculated by cross-examination; it may perhaps serve
to explain why he goes on the stand feeling that he is testifying
on behalf of an irresponsible unfortunate whose mental condi-
tion should be taken into account in dealing with him, and
leaves the stand wondering whether he has not helped to tighten
the noose about his neck. .... The picture which the general
public usually forms of insanity as a defense in a murder trial
is a series of bewhiskered experts solemnly testifying that the
accused is insane, followed by equally hirsute and learned men
testifying that he is sane. The natural reaction of the layman
is to discount the whole business, and no doubt this is what
practically happens in the case of many juries .... The result
is, of course-a man being presumed sane by the law-that the
accused loses all the benefit of a doubt as to his mental condi-
tion. . . . The purpose of cross-examination is to discredit the
witness and vitiate his testimony .... The most common attack
in cross-examination is by attacking independently each symptom
quoted by the doctor in giving his reason for thinking the accused
of unsound mind. This is quite effective and exasperating, its
effectiveness lying in the fact that mental disorder is, speaking
broadly, not demonstrable in any examination of the patient at
one time, nor in any single act committed by him, but in a broad
view of his conduct over a certain period of time, or in the cir-
cumstances and setting, say, of his criminal act. In other words,
the conclusion to which an alienist comes, especially when his
opinion is based on a hypothetical question, is often all the result
of a process of inductive reasoning, which automatically lays
65 13 Jour. Crixa. Law 228 (1922).
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itself open to the attack that all the facts were not known ...
They [hypothetical questions] are of course attacked by drop-
ping each part of them in turn and saying, "Now, suppose we
leave that out, would that affect your opinion?" The unwary
witness may then see four or five of his symptoms dropped out
and then become uneasy at their dwindling, say when it is sug-
gested that the next symptom be elided, that he would then
change his opinion. This gives the cross-examiner his oppor-
tunity. He says, "In other words, you wouldn't call him insane
without this symptom (or act), but you would with it?" This
forces an undue attention on this particular symptom and it is
attacked intensively, with the result that the witness is obliged
to admit that it is not in itself indicative of insanity, it seems
to the jury as if he had abandoned the one thing he emphasized.
Under present conditions of a criminal trial the most
effective testimony or evidence that an expert psychia-
trist can give is his opinion based on an actual and com-
plete examination of the accused, as will appear from the
scope of a psychiatric examination indicated in the en-
suing description adapted from Dr. Singer's report in
the Illinois Crime Survey.6 6
A psychiatric examination is a study of the kind of behavior
shown by the person under study. How has he reacted to cir-
cumstances throughout his life? This is discovered by a scrutiny
of his life story as given both by himself and by others and in-
cludes the conditions he has had to meet, as well as the manner
in which he has met them-his school, home, work and play life;
his interests, ambitions, hopes, and fears and the way in which
he has dealt with them; his manner of expressing emotion, his
balance and poise; his habits and associations. His manner of
behaving at the time of the examination is studied by investigat-
ing his memory and appreciation of the facts of the world around
him, his emotional responses, thoughts and conclusions in re-
sponse to situations placed before him by means of questions
and requests for action.
The direct observations of the man himself are supplemented by
the stories told by relatives, friends and others who have had
66 P. 748.
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opportunity to observe him at various stages in his career and
under various conditions. This serves not only to establish the
facts but also to check the statements of the man himself as to
their validity and significance.
The two features outlined are by far the most important part
of the examination. In addition, it is desirable to study the func-
tion of the body organs, particularly of the nervous system;
consideration is given also to the history of the family from which
the man is descended with the object of discovering evidences
of faults in the stock. These phases of the examination, however,
can never establish the fact of insanity; they can offer only a
possible explanation for its existence, if present, and some clews
as to the nature of the disease.
The disagreement of experts in criminal trials is al-
ways emphasized by lawyers and judges in considering
the problem of expert testimony, 7 nor has this feature of
the problem been lost sight of by others either. Besides,
disagreement among psychiatrists is not peculiarly char-
acteristic of their profession. "Judges have been known
to disagree in the interpretations of the laws and in the
same way physicians may be expected to disagree at
times in the interpretations of symptoms."
68
VI. PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The law occasionally allows the parties interested in a
legal controversy to rely on certain facts that are usually
true and so are presumed true without proof. Such a
presumption, it is said, is not evidence, but is merely
called upon to satisfy the requisites of a prima facie
case. One such presumption is that of sanity. Every
67 " Agreement between experts for the prosecution and defense occurs
much more frequently than is generally known .... Yet the consequences
of this disagreement is so sensational that these cases completely over-
shadow those in which an agreement is reached." Illinois Crime Survey,
pp. 790, 759.
68 Overholzer, "Psychiatry and the Courts of Massachusetts,' 1 19 Jour.
Crim. Law 78.
For a discussion of the Expert Testimony Bill prepared by a commit-
tee of the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, see 30 Harvard L.
Rev. 537.
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man is presumed sane in a criminal case as well as in
a civil one. 9 But what is the effect of such a presump-
tion in a criminal case where insanity is pleaded as a
defense? Does such a presumption put the burden of
proving insanity on the defendant?
It was so suggested in the case of Fisher v. People,7 °
the first case in Illinois in which the problem of mental
disorder as related to the criminal law was discussed.
Every man will be presumed sane until the contrary appears....
Before such a plea [of insanity] be allowed to prevail, satisfac-
tory evidence should be offered that the accused . . . was
affected with insanity, and at the time he committed the act
was incapable of appreciating its enormity.
The first sentence of this quotation, which seems to cast
the burden on the defendant of proving his insanity, has
been followed apparently with approval in a number of
cases.
71
But it is submitted that Fisher v. People, was errone-
ously decided insofar as it placed the burden of proof
of mental disorder on the defendant. And the Supreme
Court in Hopps v. People72 expressly alluded to the un-
fortunate language of the Fisher case and qualified it. It
was there held that
in sustaining such a defense [of insanity], it is not necessary
that the insanity of the accused be established even by a pre-
ponderance of proof; but if, upon the whole evidence, the jury
entertain a reasonable doubt of his sanity, they must acquit..
69 Fisher v. People, 23 Ill. 218 (1859); People v. Gilmore, 320 Il1. 233,
150 N. E. 631 (1920), and other cases too numerous to cite.
7023 fl1. 218 (1859).
71 See People v. Geary, 297 Ill. 608, 131 N. E. 97 (1921), where the
court said, "This presumption inheres at every stage of the trial until
insanity is made to appear by the evidence"; People v. Ortiz, 320 Ill.
205, 150 N. E. 708 (1926), where the court said, "Every person is pre-
sumed sane and responsible until the contrary appears"; and Wharton
on Criminal Law, (12th ed., 1932), in see. 78, so states the Illinois rule,
citing largely civil cases.
7231 InI. 385 (1863).
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It is submitted that this case states the correct rule
in Illinois as to the burden of proof of insanity in crim-
inal cases, and has been followed in a great number of
cases.
73
Where a state of mental disorder has once been shown
to exist, however, there is generally a presumption that
it has continued to exist.
As a general rule, when insanity is proven as existing at a
particular period, it will be presumed to continue until dis-
proved. This rule, however, is subject to several qualifications.
One is that the insanity shown to have existed prior to the
commission of the act must be of a permanent type or of a
continuing nature, or possessed of the characteristics of an
habitual or confirmed disorder of the mind, or its peculiarities
must have been exhibited for a long series of years. It is not
sufficient that there be proof of a temporary or spasmodic mania.
Another is that too long a period of time must not be shown
to have elapsed between the proved insanity and the act
charged. The insanity which authorizes the removal of a con-
vict from the penitentiary to an asylum for the insane is not
necessarily an insanity of a permanent kind. It may be as-
sumed, pretended, or merely temporary. The removal is not
based upon insanity that is determined by an inquest or legal
adjudication, but because the attending physician or warden
advises it.
7 4
73 See Chase v. People, 40 Ill. 352 (1866); Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555,
6 N. E. 165 (1886); Montag v. People, 141 ll. 75, 30 N. E. 337 (1892);
Jamison v. People, 145 ll. 357, 34 N. E. 486 (1893); People v. Casey,
231 li. 261, 83 N. E. 278 (1907); People v. Ahrling, 279 Ill. 70, 116 N. E.
764 (1907); People v. Haensel, 293 Il. 33, 127 N. E. 181 (1920); People
v. Bacon, 293 ll. 210, 127 N. E. 386 (1920); People v. Cochran, 313 Ill.
508, 145 N. E. 207 (1924); People v. Krauser, 315 ll. 485, 146 N. E. 593
(1925); People v. Saylor, 319 ill. 205, 149 N. E. 767 (1925); People v.
Christensen, 336 Ill. 251, 168 N. E. 292 (1929); and Wharton on Criminal
Law, (12th ed., 1932), sec. 79, correctly stating the Illinois law.
In Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620, 32 N. E. 677 (1892), the Supreme
Court held it not to be error to refuse an instruction to the effect that
the jury should acquit if they entertained a reasonable doubt as to the
sanity of the defendant, stating that the acquittal must be on the
ground of a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, not merely as to his sanity.
Compare People v. Penman, 272 ll. 82, 111 N. E. 544 (1915), where
substantially such a refusal was held error as ignoring the defense of
insanity.
74 Langdon v. People, 133 Ill. 382, 24 N. E. 874 (1890).
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But it is likewise held that proof of insanity at one par-




Much of the confusion of the court decisions and much
of the disrespect into which expert testimony has fallen
is largely due to the persistence in treating primarily
psychological and sociological problems (i.e., maladjusted
or disorganized personalities reflected in the behavior
branded criminal) by conventional legal methods. The
artificiality of the legal attitude toward mental disorder
may be attributed largely to its strong predisposition to
consider the mental processes as highly departmentalized,
to ignore completely the essential mental unity, and to
require that the causal connection between the alleged
delusion and the criminal act be apparent to laymen.
With an emphasis out of all proportion on the cognitive
aspects of mental life, the legal tests have tended com-
pletely to ignore the conative-affectional aspects. Courts
have repeatedly insisted that deviations in the latter as-
pects are insufficient and really insignificant, with a few
scattered exceptions.
Besides these difficulties, there is the added one of term-
inology, the importance of which cannot be too greatly
emphasized. The psychiatric expert is constantly asked
questions on the stand purposely phrased in words vague
in legal meaning-as "responsibility "-and utterly use-
less and misleading as far as the expert is concerned.
The language of the law, while it might have been all right a
hundred or two years ago, is not any longer usable by the present-
day psychiatrist who finds himself unequal to thinking in such
terms and much less able to use them exclusively, as he is
required to do on the witness stand, for the expression of his
thoughts.77
75 People v. Shroyer, 336 Ill. 324, 168 N. E. 336 (1929).
76 The writer is deeply obligated to his guide in the study of social
science, Professor Edwin H. Sutherland, of the Department of Sociology
in the University of Chicago, for a point of view.
77 White, Insanity and the Criminal Law, p. 104.
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The physician is only on safe grounds in presenting his report
when he formulates the data in the language of medicine and
keeps within the categories of biology. When he is forced to
use such equivocal terms as "insanity" or such metaphysical
terms as "responsibility" he is apt to get into trouble.78
It has been argued by some writers of the law79 that the
irresistible impulse test, which seems to have been ac-
cepted by the Illinois Supreme Court, would fairly ade-
quately cover most of the cases not falling within the
knowledge tests. While unquestionably the acceptance
of such a test by the courts does indicate a change of em-
phasis from the knowledge criteria, yet the difficulties of
proof in such cases, the essential psychological unsound-
ness in the emphasis upon the "power to choose," and
the necessarily hybrid quality of the test are not "cal-
culated to simplify the task of the jury."80
In 1921 the Massachusetts General Court enacted a
statute," designated the Briggs Act after its firm ad-
vocate, providing for the compulsory examination of any
person accused of a capital offense, or of a felony if he
has a prior criminal record, by physicians of the depart-
ment of mental disease, who submit their reports to the
clerk of the court of district in which the indictment was
found, where it will be accessible to interested parties, as
the judge, district attorney, and defense counsel. Since
78 Campbell, "Crime and Punishment: From the Point of View of the
Psycho-pathologist," 19 Jour. Crim. Law 248.
79 Professor Sheldon Glueck, in the concluding chapter of his work
previously referred to, offers as an immediate recommendation a tolerable
exposition of the law in the form of a jury charge, including the test
of irresistible impulse and giving some emphasis to mental unity.
But it is unduly long, contains unnecessary (and hence confusing)
variations of terms, is inconsistent in the use of '"partially insane and
semi-responsible" in the same breath with an emphasis upon mental
unity and interdependence, and is certainly clear neither to a lawyer nor
to a psychologist, to say nothing of the jury.
80 Tulin, "Problem of Mental Disorder in Crime," 32 Col. L. Rev. 942
(1932).
81 Massachusetts General Laws, Ch. 123, sec. 100A. For construction
and application of the act, see Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass.
391, 153 N. E. 881 (1926), and Commonwealth v. Vallarelli, 273 Mass.
240, 173 N. E. 582 (1929).
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such examinations are prescribed as routine, they tend to
be impartial and eliminate to a great extent the duels of
psychiatrists.2
Under [this] procedure, protracted and expensive trials have
been avoided, and the necessity of bringing a mentally ill de-
fendant into court to undergo trial has been avoided. Society
has been protected better than otherwise; not only has the psy-
chotic or mentally defective offender been segregated in the in-
stitution where he belongs, but his commitment has been made
with such provision that he is not likely to be released until his
mental condition warrants.... He can be released only by par-
don of the governor after the latter has been assured by the De-
partment of Mental Diseases that the patient's discharge will
not cause danger to others.83
The greatest difficulties in the administration of this law
have been the lack of adequately correlated systems of
records so that many offenders escape the express pro-
vision of the statute or examinations are forced on very
short notice, insufficient co-operation by the court offi-
cials, and scanty appropriations. Practical necessity dic-
tated the restriction to capital offenders and repeaters.
But unquestionably the law is a further step in the direc-
82 "The courts have on the whole been inclined to follow the recom-
mendations of the examiners. The defense counsel also have cooperated
to an extent which even the most hopeful proponents of the law had not
expected. Almost without exception, counsel have raised no objection
to having clients examined by the department's experts, although before
the act was passed it was objected that defense lawyers would never
allow such examination. Also, counsel have in almost every instance
recognized the fairness of the examiner's report, and have not attempted
to contradict their finding by putting other experts on the witness stand.
The department's report is usually accepted by both sides, and no other
expert testimony is introduced. The act has therefore eliminated the
most depressing spectacle which the criminal law affords, 'the battle of
experts,' .in which real and pseudo-experts, without distinction, are
subjected to lengthy hypothetical questions and heckling cross-examina-
tion." Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law, pp. 406-407.
83Overholzer, "Psychiatry and the Courts of Massachusetts," 19
Jour. Crim. Law 75, at p. 80. For a further discussion of the Briggs Law
see another article by Overholzer, "Two Years' Experience with the
Briggs Law (1928-30) of Massachusetts," 23 Jour. Crim. Law 415; and by
Sheldon Glueck, "Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of
Crime," 36 Yale L. J. 632, "Regulation of Expert Testimony as to
Insanity in Criminal Cases," 38 Yale L. J. 368, and "Psychiatry and
the Massachusetts Courts as Now Related," 8 Social Forces, 77.
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tion of intelligent social legislation and should be seri-
ously recommended to state legislatures as an immediate
practical measure.
The Illinois Crime Survey, in the study conducted by
Dr. Douglas Singer on "The Deranged and Defective De-
linquent," came to the following conclusions:
1. Questions of responsibility (mental or otherwise) should
play no part in the determination of guilt. The sole question to
the jury should be: "Did he commit the offense charged?"
2. Conviction should automatically carry an indeterminate
sentence, of which the maximum is life.
3. Every person convicted should be studied psychiatrically
and medically to determine (a) what treatment is needed to
rehabilitate if possible and (b) where this treatment can be ad-
ministered with prime regard to the protection of society.
4. Release from custody should be determined only by a
study of the convict and not on the basis of any rule of thumb
based on the nature of the crime committed.
8 4
It must be submitted that these conclusions are sound.
As far as the problem of mental disorder is concerned,
the survey candidly proposes to eliminate the jury com-
pletely. Further, these conclusions contemplate an en-
tirely different philosophy of punishment in which the
meaning of the word punishment is in effect substituted
for complete individualization of treatment of the of-
fender with a view to rehabilitate him in a manner con-
sistent with public safety.,'
Objections to such conclusions may be either constitu-
tional or practical. Unquestionably any statute contem-
plating such recommended changes in penal administra-
tion would be held unconstitutional in Illinois in view of
the express provisions in the Bill of Rights section of the
Illinois Constitution of 1870, to the effect that "the right
of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain
84 P. 804. See also the address of Governor Alfred E. Smith, before
the Crime Commission, Albany, N. Y., on Sept. 7, 1927. Also, note Ball
and Kidd, "The Relation of Law and Medicine in Mental Disease," 9
Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1920).
85 Sutherland, Criminology, pp. 339-60.
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inviolate," 86 and "all penalties shall be proportioned to
the nature of the offense." 8 But it is very probable that
such a statute would not violate the "due process" clause
of the Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution,
since it has been repeatedly held that trial by jury is not
essential to "due process of law," and that any other
method of procedure will generally be held valid, as far
as the clause is concerned, if all the persons within the
state are subject to similar proceedings.8 But the objec-
tion of unconstitutionality, if it should be admitted that
the recommendations of the Illinois Crime Survey em-
body a sound scheme of penal treatment, is relevant only
in so far as necessitating a change in the fundamental
law of the state, which has been accomplished in the past
for lesser grounds, and can presumably be so changed
in the future.
Before passing on the merits of the second objection
(practicability), it may be instructive to consider some of
the pertinent facts of present-day criminal procedure.
No one can seriously contend against the characterization
of the jury system as notoriously inefficient, drawn-out,
and expensive, with few, if any, compensating features.8 9
Nor is the jury system so important practically in Illinois
since the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the competency
of the defendant to waive jury trial." A goodly propor-
86 Illinois Constitution, Art. II, sec. 5.
87 Ibid., sec. 11.
8 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900). See also Willoughby, Consti-
tutional Law of the United States, Vol. III, p. 1725 (1929); and Brand,
"The Insanity Defense," 9 Ore. L. Rev. 309 (1930).
89 See Sutherland, Criminology, pp. 273-76.
Under the present system where a defendant has been acquitted on
the ground of insanity, he is ordinarily turned loose, although formally
and legally adjudicated to have ben criminally insane at one moment in
his life. It is true that the Criminal Code, in sec. 592, requires that it
shall be the duty of the jury to find in such a case whether the defendant
is dangerous to the peace and welfare of the community, but up to re-
cently nothing was usually done. See, however, a law passed at the last
session of the legislature providing for safe incarceration. Smith-Hurd
Ill. Rev. St., 1933, Ch. 23, par. 103.
Parenthetically it might be recalled that in the notorious Loeb and
Leopold case the evidence as to the mental conditions of the two defend-
ants was introduced only as relevant to determining the type of punish-
ment.
90 People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930).
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tion of indictments in Cook County are disposed of by
court trials and pleas of guilty.
In conclusion, it must be observed that such a changed
system should not be independently or immediately made.
Rather they would form only a relatively small part of a
larger program of penal treatment whose objectives
would be the rehabilitation of criminals wherever possi-
ble in a manner consistent with public safety, temporary
or permanent (probably the latter) incarceration of
those who cannot be reformed, and the prevention of
crime. The social scientist must candidly confess his in-
ability at the present time to supply the details of such a
penal program, for the techniques must be worked out
pragmatically, constantly modified and reconstructed."1
In the words of Professor Edwin H. Sutherland:
It is desirable to regard punishment as a thing which has
been tending for some time to disappear and be replaced by
those other methods, and as a thing which, from the point of
view of ethics and philosophy, it is desirable to get rid of as
quickly as the general public can be induced to take the other
attitude toward the criminals. The proper procedure, doubtless,
is the one that has actually been used-an extension of the atti-
tude of control by knowledge of the situation to larger and larger
groups of offenders rather than a complete change over-night.9 2
91 For a critical survey of the present "science" of criminology and
what it "knows," see Michael and Adler, Crime, Law, and Social Science
(New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1933). In the new Mexican Penal
Code the word "punishment" is expressly abolished (probably only on
paper). "It is inspired by the conception that society does not need to
be angry and to be bitter against criminals in order to keep the welfare
of the community. In drafting this new penal code we did not need go,
however, so far as to establish that all of the criminals are sick people,
as some of the observers of the Mexican criminology have asserted. It
was enough to assume, that criminals are dangerous beings for the com-
mon interests of society, for dealing with the problem. Nevertheless, it
seemed to us that society would have a better chance to combat the evil
of crime if it could acquire something like the coldness and simplicity of
physicians and surgeons when they cut and cure." Professor Salvador
Mendoza, "The New Mexican System of Criminology," 21 Jour. Crim.
Law 15 (1930).
"The measures of social defense shall not aim at punishment or
retaliation; they shall be expedient; they shall not humiliate human
dignity and aim at the infliction of useless and superfluous suffering."
Art. 6, Draft of the General Part of the Penal Code of Soviet Russia.
92 Sutherland, Criminology, p. 360.
This article has been developed from a study begun in Dean Donald
Slesinger's course on Legal Sociology, given in the University of Chicago
during the winter quarter of 1933.
